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A B S T R A C T
Cognitive Credibility Assessment (CCA) is a verbal lie detection tool consisting of several interview techniques. These 
techniques have been examined separately but never together. Reflecting the dynamic nature of CCA we combined several 
of the techniques (free recall followed by a model statement, followed by a reverse order instruction, and followed by a 
sketch instruction). We examined the new information provided after each stage of the interview and also compared 
the information provided in the initial recall with the information provided after the entire interview. A total of 47 
truth tellers and 47 lie tellers went on a mission. Truth tellers were asked to report their mission truthfully, whereas 
lie tellers were requested to lie about several aspects of the mission. We measured the total units of information (total 
details) provided in the interview and the number of complications reported. The results indicate that the pre-registered 
hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) was supported for complications. Truth tellers reported more complications than lie tellers in 
each stage of the interview and the difference was more pronounced after the entire interview than after the free recall. 
As a conclusion, CCA was an effective lie detection method when complications were taken into account.
Combinando técnicas verbales de evaluación de la veracidad para discriminar 
testimonios verdaderos de falsos
R E S U M E N
La evaluación cognitiva de la credibilidad (ECC) es una herramienta verbal de detección de mentiras que incluye varias 
técnicas de entrevista. Dichas técnicas se han examinado por separado pero nunca juntas. Para reflejar el carácter dinámico 
de la ECC combinamos varias de las técnicas (recuerdo libre seguido de una declaración tipo, seguido de una instrucción de 
recuerdo en orden inverso,  y de una instrucción para que hagan un sketch -esquema- durante la narración del evento). Ana-
lizamos la información nueva proporcionada tras cada etapa de la entrevista y también comparamos la información proce-
dente del recuerdo inicial con la aportada por toda la entrevista. Un total de 47 sujetos que decían la verdad y 47 que mentían 
fueron enviados a una misión. A los participantes de la condición de testimonio verdadero se les pidió que informaran de su 
misión de modo veraz, mientras que los de la condición de mentira se les solicitó que mintieran sobre distintos aspectos de 
la misión. Se midió el total de unidades de información (detalles totales) de la entrevista y el número de complicaciones de 
las que se informaba. Los resultados mostraron que los participantes de la condición de verdad informaban de más detalles y 
complicaciones (hipótesis 1) en cada fase de la entrevista siendo las mayores diferencias tras la entrevista global que tras el 
recuerdo libre. En conclusión, la categoría complicaciones de la ECC es eficaz en la detección de la mentira.
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The cues to deceit that lie tellers spontaneously display are 
typically faint and unreliable (DePaulo et al., 2003; DePaulo & Morris, 
2004), which encouraged researchers to design interview protocols 
to elicit more distinctive cues (Vrij & Granhag, 2012). To date this 
line of research has resulted in the development of various verbal 
veracity assessment tools, including Assessment Criteria Indicative 
of Deception (Colwell et al., 2013; Colwell et al., 2015; Colwell et al., 
2009), Cognitive Credibility Assessment (Vrij, 2014, 2015; Vrij, Fisher, 
et al., 2017), the Strategic Use of Evidence (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008, 
2015; Hartwig et al., 2014), and the Verifiability Approach (Nahari, 
2018; Nahari & Vrij, 2019; Vrij & Nahari 2019).
In this article, we focus on Cognitive Credibility Assessment 
(CCA). The core of CCA is that truth tellers and lie tellers differ in the 
cognitive processes and strategies that they use to appear convincing. 
Investigators can exploit these differences through the use of specific 
interview techniques. When effective, it should enhance the verbal 
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differences between truth tellers and lie tellers. In CCA research to 
date these interview techniques have been examined separately. This 
does not reflect the dynamic nature of good information-gathering 
interviewing, which typically consists of different questioning 
techniques to require as much information as possible (Fisher & 
Geiselman, 1992). Neither does it reflect the dynamic nature of CCA 
(Vrij, Fisher, et al., 2017; Vrij et al., 2015). In the current experiment, 
we tested the efficacy of CCA while reflecting the dynamic nature 
of an interview-setting by combining several of the CCA techniques 
in one interview protocol: an initial recall followed by the model 
statement technique, the reverse order technique, and the sketching 
while narrating technique. We added one more technique, the 
verifiable sources technique, to the sequence. We examined the 
new information provided after each stage of the interview and also 
compared the information provided in the initial recall with the 
information provided throughout the entire interview.
Veracity and the Information Provided 
In the present experiment, we focused on two verbal cues related to 
veracity, total details, and complications. Total details is the verbal cue 
most frequently examined to date (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008) and 
complications showed promising results in recent years (Vrij & Vrij, 2020). 
Truth tellers typically report more details than lie tellers (Amado et al., 
2016). Truth tellers’ memory of an experienced event is often richer than 
lie tellers’ memory of a fabricated event. Lie tellers may therefore be unable 
to report as many details as truth tellers, because they lack the imagination 
to fabricate as many details as truth tellers that sound plausible (Köhnken, 
2004). Lie tellers may also be unwilling to report as many details as truth 
tellers and prefer to keep their stories simple (Hartwig et al., 2007). They 
may fear that details they provide result in leads to investigators (Nahari 
et al., 2014) or that they will not remember these details anymore when 
interviewed about the event again in the future (Vrij, 2008).
A complication is an occurrence that affects the story-teller and 
makes a situation more complex (“It was too hot in my room, because 
the air conditioning was not working properly in the hotel”). Truth 
tellers typically report more complications than lie tellers (Amado et 
al., 2016), a finding obtained in Western (Vrij, Leal, Jupe, et al., 2018) 
and non-Western samples (Russian, Korean, and Hispanic samples; 
Vrij & Vrij, 2020) and in interviews with or without an interpreter 
(Vrij & Leal, 2020). In addition, in an experiment where lie tellers were 
encouraged to include complications in their reports they still included 
fewer complications than truth tellers (Vrij, Leal, et al., 2020). Making up 
complications requires cognitive resources, but lie tellers may not have 
adequate cognitive resources to do so (Köhnken, 2004; Vrij, 2008). In 
addition, adding complications makes the story more complex, which is 
in conflict with lie tellers’ inclination to keep their stories simple.
Total details is a combination of two types of detail: contextual details 
and perceptual details. Contextual details are details related to space and 
time; perceptual details are details related to senses (what people saw, 
heard, smelled, etc.). Complications is not a type of detail. Instead, it is 
a cluster of details that become a complication due to their combined 
meaning. For example, the sentence given above (“It was too hot1 in 
my2 room3, because the air conditioning4 was not working5 properly in 
the hotel6”) contains six details but the combined meaning of these six 
details results in a complication. 
The Model Statement, Reverse Order Recall, Sketching while 
Narrating, and Verifiable Sources: Information Provided and 
Differential Effect on Truth Tellers and Lie Tellers
Model Statement
A model statement is an example of a detailed account unrelated 
to the topic of the interview that is presented to interviewees during 
an interview (Leal et al., 2015). People typically do not initially recall 
all information that is in their memory (Vrij et al., 2014), which is 
in part dictated by social rules. Such rules imply that people restrict 
themselves to providing only a limited amount of information when 
answering a question. When someone is asked by a colleague on 
Monday morning what s/he did during the weekend, the answer is 
likely to be just a few words or few sentences (Vrij, Leal, & Fisher, 
2018). People may realise that more information is expected from 
them in a formal interview but they then still underestimate how 
much information they are expected to provide (Vrij, Leal, & Fisher, 
2018). One effective way to raise truth tellers’ expectations about 
how much information to provide in an interview is to expose them 
to a model statement (Leal et al., 2015). Research has shown that a 
model statement results in more information than the verbal request 
to provide a detailed description (Vrij, Leal, & Fisher, 2018), perhaps 
because the former is a concrete example whereas the latter is an 
abstract instruction. It is probably easier for people to follow concrete 
examples than to follow abstract instructions (Leal, Vrij, Deeb, et al., 
2018).
A model statement raises the expectations to report more 
information in both truth tellers and lie tellers (Ewens, Vrij, Leal, et 
al., 2016), which makes the model statement an ineffective tool to 
discriminate between truth tellers and lie tellers when additional 
details are considered (Vrij, Leal, Deeb, et al., 2018; Vrij, Leal, Deeb 
et al., 2019; Vrij, Leal et al., 2020). However, research has shown 
that a model statement is an effective veracity assessment tool 
when complications are considered, with truth tellers reporting 
more additional complications than lie tellers after exposure to 
a model statement (Vrij, Leal, Deeb et al., 2019; Vrij, Leal, Jupe, et 
al., 2018; Vrij, Leal, et al., 2020). Complications are often not about 
key aspects of the activities that someone describes, and the story 
can be well understood without reporting the complications (Vrij, 
Leal, & Fisher, 2018). Therefore, complying with the social rule 
not to report all information they know, truth tellers may leave 
out at least some complications when they are not exposed to a 
model statement, but may decide to report them after a model 
statement when expectations of how much information to report 
are raised. Liars prefer to keep their story simple and may therefore 
be reluctant to provide complications, because the addition of 
complications make a story more complex.
Reverse Order Recall
In a reverse order recall (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992) interviewees 
are asked to report an event in reversed chronological order (e.g., 
“Please tell me what you did last night, but start from the moment 
you went to bed and take me back through to the moment the 
evening started”). People encode in their memory details of an event 
in the chronological time order they occurred. People typically report 
events in that chronological time order when asked to report all 
details they can remember about an event. A reverse order instruction 
runs counter to the natural forward-order coding and reporting 
of events (Gilbert & Fisher, 2006; Kahana, 1996). This makes truth 
tellers to think about the event again but this time from another 
perspective. Different perspective taking often allows people to 
retrieve information from their memory they did not retrieve before 
and therefore often leads new information not reported previously 
(Fisher & Geiselman, 1992).
Research has shown that a reverse order recall leads to more 
additional information from truth tellers than from lie tellers 
(Ewens, Vrij, Mann, et al., 2016; Shaw et al., 2014). This may occur 
because truth tellers’ memory of a truly experienced event is likely 
to be richer in detail than lie tellers’ memory of a fabricated event. 
This gives truth tellers more opportunity and makes it easier for 
them to add details than for lie tellers. Alternatively, lie tellers 
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are very much focused on consistency because they believe that 
inconsistent answers may give their lies away (Deeb et al., 2017; 
Granhag & Strömwall, 1999; Strömwall et al., 2004). When we 
demonstrated the reverse order technique to practitioners, some 
volunteer lie tellers reported that they thought the reverse order 
instruction is a ‘trick’ to check whether they can repeat in reverse 
order the same information they mentioned earlier. Lie tellers who 
think this are unlikely to add details to their stories. Complications 
have never been examined in combination with a reverse order 
instruction, but the same reasoning as to why truth tellers are 
likely to report more additional details than lie tellers in response 
to a reverse order instruction is likely to apply to complications.
Sketching While Narrating
Sketching while narrating refers to asking interviewees to make a 
sketch of the event while discussing the event (Fisher & Geiselman, 
1992). Sketching while narrating facilitates recall in adults (Dando et 
al., 2009; Leins et al., 2014; Mattison et al., 2015). Vrij, Mann et al. 
(2020) provided five reasons why sketching while narrating facilitates 
recall: (i) it mentally reinstates the context of the interviewee’s 
experience; (ii) drawing one aspect of an event may cue retrieval 
of other aspects of that event; (iii) it is a visual output compatible 
with visually experienced events; (iv) it is a time-consuming activity 
that slows down the thinking process and thus gives interviews good 
opportunity to search their memory; and (v) it automatically leads 
to providing spatial information because someone must situate each 
person or object in a specific location in the sketch.
Research has shown that sketching while narrating results 
in more additional details and more additional complications 
from truth tellers than from lie tellers (Vrij, Leal, Fisher, et al., 
2018; Vrij, Mann, et al., 2020). Again, a truth teller’s memory of a 
truly experienced event is likely to be richer in detail than a lie 
teller’s memory of a fabricated event, which gives truth tellers 
more opportunity and makes it easier for them to add detail and 
complications than for lie tellers.
Verifiable Sources
Arguably, the best way to detect deceit is by comparing 
an interviewee’s statement with the available evidence. Such 
comparisons are frequently made by investigators and in daily life 
more lies are discovered this way than by any other method (Park 
et al., 2002). Derived from the Verifiability Approach we added one 
question to the interview protocol, requesting interviewees to report 
their experiences one final time but now to include as many details as 
possible the interviewer could check. Research has shown that truth 
tellers report more details that can be checked than lie tellers (Vrij & 
Nahari, 2019), because for lie tellers it is often impossible to provide 
evidence for their fabricated events.
Following Leal, Vrij, Deeb, et al. (2018) and Vrij, Leal, Deeb, et al. 
(2019), rather than counting the number of checkable details we 
counted the number of checkable sources. To explain the difference, 
the sentence “I spoke with my friend Fred at 10.30 this morning” 
contains five verifiable details (the underlined words) and one 
verifiable source (‘Fred’). We counted verifiable sources rather 
than verifiable details for applied reasons, because the number of 
verifiable sources is easier to count in real time than the number of 
verifiable details. Verifiable sources and verifiable details are related 
with each other because a verifiable source leads to verifiable details 
(Leal, Vrij, Deeb, et al. ,2018).
The verifiable sources question is primarily aimed at eliciting 
verifiable sources, not at eliciting new details about the event or 
complications, however this could occur. That is, if participants 
focus on possible verifiable sources, new details about the event 
may be remembered and mentioned and this new information 
could include complications.
Hypotheses
This experiment is pre-registered at https://osf.io/gx7vf. We 
tested five hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 was pre-registered. Hypotheses 
2, 3, and 4 are exploratory hypotheses and derived from Hypothesis 
1. As a result, if Hypothesis 1 is supported, Hypotheses 2 and 4 are 
more likely to be supported and, vice versa, if Hypothesis 1 is not 
supported, Hypotheses 2 and 4 are more likely not to be supported. 
Hypothesis 5 is also exploratory but not related to Hypothesis 1.
Pre-registered Hypothesis
Truth tellers will report more details and more complications 
than lie tellers after both the initial free recall and the entire 
interview, with the most pronounced differences after the entire 
interview (Hypothesis 1).
Exploratory Hypotheses
Truth tellers will add after each phase of the interview more details 
(except after the model statement phase) and more complications 
than lie tellers (Hypothesis 2). 
Truth tellers will show stronger linear trends of adding new 
details and new complications during each phase of the interview 
than lie tellers (Hypothesis 3).
The percentages of correct classifications of truth tellers and lie 
tellers based on details and complications will be higher after the 
entire interview than after the first recall (Hypothesis 4).
Truth tellers will report more verifiable sources than lie tellers 
(Hypothesis 5).
Method
Design
We used a one-factorial design with veracity as factor. A total 
of 47 participants were allocated to the truth condition and 47 
participants to the lie condition. Five types of analysis were carried 
out in the Hypotheses-testing section. First, to test the pre-registered 
Hypothesis 1 we carried out two ANOVAs – one for details and one 
for complications – utilising a 2 (veracity) x 2 (phase - free recall vs. 
entire interview) mixed factorial design with veracity as between-
subjects factor and phase as within-subjects factor. ‘Free recall’ refers 
to the number of details and complications reported during the free 
recall and ‘entire interview’ refers to the number of unique details and 
unique complications reported during the entire interview (all details 
and complications reported during the free recall and, added to this, 
the new details and complications reported in each subsequent phase 
of the interview). Hypothesis 1 predicts an interaction effect with a 
larger difference between truth tellers and liars to be obtained in the 
entire interview than in the free recall. The interaction effect is the 
only effect that we will discuss.
Second, to test the exploratory Hypothesis 2, two MANOVAs – 
one for details and one for complications during each phase of the 
interview – were conducted. We only examined new details and new 
complications; all repetitions were ignored (see the Coding section 
below). Third, to test the exploratory Hypothesis 3, we carried out 
two mixed ANOVAs – one for details and one for complications – with 
veracity (truth vs. lie) as between-subjects factor and phase (model 
statement, model statement + reverse order, model statement + 
reverse order + sketch, model statement + reverse order + sketch 
+ verifiable sources) as within-subjects factor. ‘Model statement’ 
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refers to the number of new details or new complications reported 
in the model statement phase of the interview. In ‘model statement 
+ reverse order’ the number of new details or new complications 
reported in the reverse order phase was added to this total, etcetera. 
The veracity x phase interaction is the key part of the analyses and 
the only effect that we will discuss.
Fourth, to test the exploratory Hypothesis 4, we carried out 
discriminant analyses to examine the percentages of correct 
classifications of truth tellers and lie tellers based on the dependent 
variables after the free recall and the entire interview. Paired-
samples t-tests were conducted to examine differences in accuracy 
rates between the free recall and the entire interview. Fifth, to test 
the exploratory Hypothesis 5, a one-way ANOVA was carried out 
with Veracity as factor and verifiable sources mentioned in the 
verifiable sources phase of the interview as dependent variable.
Participants
Initially 100 participants (university students and members of 
staff) took part but six of them did not follow the instructions (n = 
3) or misunderstood a question (n = 3). They were excluded from 
the analyses. The final sample of 94 participants included 23 males 
and 71 females; their average age was M = 23.20 years (SD = 7.29). 
Procedure
The mission. Participants met with the experimenter who told 
them to imagine that they were a secret agent for the government. 
They then received instructions for a mission they were requested 
to complete. They were instructed to go to a specific shop and buy 
a specific item; then to go to a specific location to meet the fellow 
agent who could be identified through a specific bag s/he had with 
him/her. Then they were to show the agent the purchased item and 
to exchange certain verbal codes to ensure that the participant and 
agent both know that they were dealing with the right person. Then 
they were to accept a package from the fellow agent, hide it at a 
specific place in the same university building as where the mission 
started and to return to the experimenter. They were then given a 
map with the shop and location of the exchange added.
After completing the mission, the experimenter gave them the 
following instructions depending on what experimental condition 
the participant was in:
Truth tellers: ‘”You are now going to be interviewed. The 
interviewer is on your team. Therefore, tell the interviewer everything 
that you can remember about your mission in as much detail and as 
fully as you can. You need to convince the interviewer you are telling 
the truth. If the interviewer believes you then you will be entered 
into a draw to win a prize of up to £150 in vouchers. If you are not 
convincing you will not be entered into a draw but will instead be 
asked to write a statement about your mission. You may have some 
time to prepare if you wish.” 
Lie tellers: “You are now going to be interviewed. The interviewer 
is not on your team. Therefore, you need to mislead the interviewer 
about everything to do with the exchange. You need to report you 
went on a mission but to lie about the package, the agent you received 
it from, and the location where you met the agent and received it. 
However, you need to convince the interviewer you are telling 
the truth. If the interviewer believes you then you will be entered 
into a draw to win a prize of up to £150 in vouchers. If you are not 
convincing you will not be entered into a draw but will instead be 
asked to write a statement about your mission. You may have some 
time to prepare if you wish.” 
Pre-interview questionnaire. After completing their 
preparations, participants were asked to complete a pre-interview 
questionnaire. Participants were instructed to complete the pre-
interview questionnaire honestly. In the pre-interview questionnaire, 
after reporting details about gender and age, participants rated 
their thoroughness of preparation via three items: (1) shallow to (7) 
thorough; (1) insufficient to (7) sufficient; and (1) poor to (7) good. 
The answers to the three questions were averaged (Cronbach’s alpha = 
.83) and the variable is called ‘preparation thoroughness’. Participants 
were also asked whether they thought they were given enough time 
to prepare themselves with the following question: “Do you think the 
amount of time you were given to prepare was: (1) insufficient to 
(7) sufficient?” Finally, participants were asked how motivated they 
were to perform well during the interview: (1) not at all motivated to 
(5) very motivated.
The interview. After completing the pre-interview questionnaire 
participants were taken to the interview room. The interviewer 
started by saying: “I will interview you about the mission you just 
completed. Depending on your answers, we may decide to interview 
you a second time”. The interviewer then asked five questions (see 
Appendix) always in the same order. The rationale for this order is 
as follows: 
Phase 1. The initial free recall of the mission is meant to obtain an 
initial statement from the interviewee. Such a recall is recommended 
as an opening request in the interviewing literature (Fisher, 2010; 
Griffith & Milne, 2006).
Phase 2. A model statement followed by the request to report the 
mission again but this time taking into account the number of details 
reported in the model statement. We introduced the model statement 
at phase 2 because it is known to elicit additional details from 
interviewees after an initial recall (Vrij, Leal, Jupe, et al., 2018; Vrij, 
Leal, Deeb, et al., 2019; Vrij, Leal, et al., 2020). The model statement 
was a 1.30 minutes long detailed account of someone attending 
a Formula 2 motor racing event. The account was a spontaneous, 
unscripted, recall of an event truly experienced by the person and 
introduced by Leal et al. (2015).
Phase 3. An invitation to report the mission again but this time 
in reverse order. We introduced the reverse order recall to retrieve 
some more details about the entire mission. We included it at this 
phase rather than before the model statement because we expected 
lie tellers to have added details at the model statement phase. If 
their aim at the reverse order phase is to repeat what they have said 
before, the task would now be harder due to the additional details 
they provided at the model statement phase. We thought the more 
difficult their task of repeating information is, the less likely it is that 
they would consider adding new details.
Phase 4. An invitation to sketch and narrate everything the 
interviewee experienced at the location where the exchange took 
place, one of the key moments of the mission. The interviewing 
literature recommends asking more focused questions after the 
general questions (Fisher, 2010; Griffith & Milne, 2006) and the 
sketching while narrating instruction is an efficient ‘zoom-in’ 
question.
Phase 5. An invitation to report the entire mission once again 
but this time to include sources the interviewer could possibly 
check. A question linking the statement with the evidence outside 
the interview room is a suitable question to finish an interview with 
as the answer provides investigative leads to follow up after the 
interview.
Post-interview questionnaire. When the participant had 
finished the interview, s/he returned to the experimenter to complete 
the post-interview questionnaire. Participants were instructed to 
complete the post-interview questionnaire honestly. Participants 
were asked to indicate the extent to which they told the truth during 
the interview on an 11-point Likert scale ranging from 0% to 100%. 
It also measured rapport with the interviewer, because rapport is 
an important motivator for a productive interview (Brimbal et al., 
2019). It was measured via the nine-item Interaction Questionnaire 
(Vallano & Schreiber Compo, 2011). Participants rated the interviewer 
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on 7-point scales ranging from [1] not at all to [7] extremely on 
nine characteristics such as smooth, bored, engrossed, and involved 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .82). 
On completing the post-interview questionnaire, participants 
were thanked and fully debriefed. They were given £15 or 1.5 
participant pool credits for taking part. All participants were also 
included in the draw to win a voucher and nobody had to write a 
statement. 
Coding
Four experienced coders coded the transcripts. Two of them 
coded ‘total details’ whilst the other two coded the complications and 
verifiable sources. In each case, one person coded all the transcripts 
whilst the other person coded a random 25 transcripts for inter-rater 
reliability calculation. 
Detail. The interviews were audio-taped and transcribed. Coding 
took place on the transcripts. The coders were blind to the veracity 
condition and coded each detail in the interview. A detail is defined 
as a non-redundant unit of information. For example, the following 
sentence has nine details: “I went to Sainsbury, to the ‘free from’ 
section where I found the chocolate bar. It was 50p and I paid with a 
£1 coin.” Each detail in the interview was coded only once; repetitions 
were not coded. Inter-rater reliability between the two coders, using 
the two-way random effects model measuring consistency, was 
excellent (single measures ICC = .97).
Complications. One coder, blind to the veracity condition, coded 
all the complications in the transcripts. Repetitions were not coded. 
A complication is an occurrence that affects the story-teller and 
makes a situation more complex (Vrij, Leal, et al., 2020). Examples 
of complications are: (a) “It started to rain so I got my umbrella out”; 
(b) “In the shop I asked someone where the chocolate was because I 
could not find it”; and (c) “I had difficulty finding her because she sat 
right in the corner”. Inter-rater reliability between the two coders, 
using the two-way random effects model measuring consistency, was 
very good (single measures, intraclass correlation coefficient, ICC = 
.90).
Verifiable sources. One coder, blind to the veracity condition, 
coded all the verifiable sources reported in the transcripts. This 
included mentioning of CCTV cameras (“There are cameras in 
Sainsbury’s”), people that can be traced (“And then I went to Eldon 
Building where I saw a friend called David”), receipts (“I have a 
receipt from my Sainsbury’s purchase”), and phone signals (“I 
had my phone with me so you could track my GPS”). Inter-rater 
reliability between the two coders, using the two-way random 
effects model measuring consistency, was very good (single 
measures, intraclass correlation coefficient, ICC = .90).
Results
Preparation Thoroughness, Preparation Time, Motivation, 
and Rapport
A MANOVA was carried out with veracity (truth vs. lie) as the 
only factor and preparation thoroughness, preparation time, 
motivation and rapport as dependent variables. The multivariate 
effect was not significant, F(4, 89) = 1.23, p = .304, ηp
2 = .05. At a 
univariate level, none of the effects were significant either, all Fs 
< 1.83, all ps > .179. Preparation thoroughness, preparation time, 
and rapport were measured on 7-point Likert scales and motivation 
on a 5-point Likert scale. The grand mean scores for preparation 
thoroughness (M = 5.10, SD = 1.25), preparation time (M = 5.09, SD 
= 1.39), and rapport (M = 5.17, SD = 0.85) indicated that participants 
thought that their preparation thoroughness, their preparation 
time, and their rapport with the interviewer were good. The grand 
mean for motivation (M = 4.43, SD = 0.61) shows that participants 
were very motivated.
Percentage of Truth Telling
An ANOVA was carried out with veracity (truth vs. lie) as factor 
and percentage of truth telling as dependent variable. The analysis 
showed a significant effect, F(1, 92) = 378.36, p < .001, d = 4.01 (3.26, 
4.65). Truth tellers (M = 99.57, SD = 2.04, 95% CI [95.15, 104.00]) 
reported to have been more truthful than lie tellers (M = 38.30, SD 
= 21.50, 95% CI [33.87, 42.72]). This shows that the manipulation 
check was successful, but note that also lie tellers indicated that a 
large part of information they reported was truthful.
Hypothesis Testing: Pre-registered Hypothesis 1
In the two hypotheses-testing sections, we report both Cohen’s 
d scores and the Bayes factor, BF10. Bayes factors (BFs) quantify the 
evidence for the alternative hypothesis (presence of an effect) relative 
to the null hypothesis (absence of an effect), and vice versa. Thus, as 
BF10 increases, there is more evidence in support of the alternative 
hypothesis, but the inverse yields the opposite (i.e., 1/BF10) and 
provides more evidence in support of the null hypothesis (Jaroz 
& Wiley, 2014). BFs between 1 and 3 suggest weak evidence, BFs 
between 3 and 10 suggest strong evidence and BFs > 10 suggest very 
strong evidence for the alternative hypothesis, whereas BFs between 
0.33 and 1 suggest weak evidence, BFs between 0.10 and 0.33 suggest 
strong evidence and BFs < 0.10 suggest very strong evidence for the 
null hypothesis (Jeffreys, 1961). We used the default Cauchy’s prior of 
.707 for the Bayesian t-tests (Lakens, 2016).
Details. A 2 (veracity) x 2 (phase - free recall vs. all interview) 
mixed ANOVA was carried out with veracity as between-subjects factor 
and phase as within-subjects factor. Total details was the dependent 
variable. The interaction effect is of key interest. It was not significant, 
F(1, 92) = 0.66, p = .417, ηp
2 = .01. This means that the difference between 
truth tellers and liars was not more pronounced in the total interview 
than in the free recall, which does not support Hypothesis 1 for details. 
The statistics for the two details variables, details in the free recall 
(called free recall), and details in the entire interview variable (called 
total unique details) are presented in Table 1.
Complications. A 2 (veracity) x 2 (phase - free recall vs. all 
interview) mixed ANOVA was carried out with veracity as between-
subjects factor and phase as within-subjects factor. Complications 
was the dependent variable. Of key interest is the interaction 
effect, which was significant, F(1, 92) = 23.11, p < .001, ηp
2 = .20. As 
Table 1 shows truth tellers reported more complications than lie 
tellers in both the free recall and entire interview and the Bayes 
factors showed strong evidence for the alternative hypothesis. The 
effect size was medium for the initial free recall phase but large 
for the entire interview. In other words, the difference was more 
pronounced in the total interview than after the free recall, which 
supports Hypothesis 1. The statistics for the two complications 
variables, complications in the free recall (called free recall) and 
complications in the entire interview variable (called total unique 
complications) are presented in Table 1.
Hypothesis Testing: Exploratory Hypothesis 2 
Details. A MANOVA with veracity (truth vs. lie) as the only factor 
and the first five details variables listed in Table 1 (free recall through 
to verifiable sources) as dependent variables resulted in a significant 
multivariate effect, F(5, 88) = 4.35, p = .001, ηp
2 = .20. All the univariate 
results are presented in Table 1. Truth tellers reported more details 
than lie tellers in the initial free recall and in the reverse order recall. 
The effect sizes were large and medium respectively and the Bayes 
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factors show strong evidence for the alternative hypothesis in the 
free recall phase and weak evidence for the alternative hypothesis 
in the reverse order phase. The Bayes factors show strong evidence 
for the null hypothesis in the model statement and sketch phases 
and weak evidence for the null hypothesis in the verifiable sources 
phase. This means that Hypothesis 2 was not supported for details.
Complications. Parallel to the analysis of details, we carried 
out a MANOVA with veracity (truth vs. lie) as the only factor and 
the first five complications variables listed in Table 1 (free recall 
through to verifiable sources) as dependent variables. It resulted in a 
significant multivariate effect, F(5, 88) = 5.26, p < .001, ηp
2 = .23. Table 
1 shows that truth tellers reported more complications during all 
phases of the interview except in the final, verifiable details, phase. 
The effect sizes for the significant effects ranged from medium to 
large and the Bayes factor analyses showed very strong evidence for 
the alternative hypothesis in the free recall, model statement, and 
sketch phases and strong evidence for the alternative hypothesis in 
the reverse order phase. There was only weak evidence for the null 
hypothesis in the verifiable details phase. This shows support for 
Hypothesis 2 for complications.
Hypothesis Testing: Exploratory Hypothesis 3 
Details. Next, we tested whether truth tellers showed a stronger 
linear trend than lie tellers in adding details during the different 
phases of the interview by carrying out a mixed ANOVA with 
veracity (truth vs. lie) as between-subjects factor and phase (model 
statement, model statement + reverse order, model statement + 
reverse order + sketch, model statement + reverse order + sketch 
+ verifiable details) as within-subjects factor. The veracity x phase 
interaction is of main interest in this analysis. It was not significant, 
F(3, 276) = 0.65, p = .581, ηp
2 = .01, which means that Hypothesis 3 
was not supported for details.
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Figure 1. Cumulate Number of Complications at each Phase as a Function of 
Veracity.
Note. MS = model statement; RO = reverse order; VS = verifiable sources.
Complications. Next, we carried out a mixed ANOVA with 
veracity (truth vs. lie) as between-subjects factor and phase (model 
statement, model statement + reverse order, model statement + 
reverse order + sketch, model statement + reverse order + sketch + 
verifiable details) as within-subjects variable. The veracity x phase 
interaction was significant, F(3, 267) = 12.68, p < .001, ηp
2 = .12. To 
follow up this interaction effect we carried out tests for truth tellers 
and liars separately. For truth tellers the effect was significant, F(3, 
138) = 22.59, p < .001, ηp
2 = .33, with only the linear effect being 
significant, F(1, 46) = 28.23, p < .001, ηp
2 = .38. The quadratic, F(1, 46) 
= 0.68, p = .414, ηp
2 = .02, and cubic, F(1, 46) = 4.00, p = .051, ηp
2 = .08, 
effects were not significant.
For lie tellers the effect was also significant, F(3, 138) = 7.09, p 
= .004, ηp
2 = .13, with only the linear effect being significant, F(1, 
46) = 8.97, p = .004, ηp
2 = .16. The quadratic, F(1, 46) = 0.66, p = .420, 
ηp
2 = .01, and cubic, F(1, 46) = 1.21, p = .278, ηp
2 = .03 effects were 
not significant. This means that both truth tellers and liars added 
more complications during each phase of the interview. However, 
the significant interaction effect and the stronger linear effect for 
truth tellers than for lie tellers show that truth tellers did this to a 
larger extent than lie tellers, see Figure 1. This supports Hypothesis 
3 for complications
Hypothesis Testing: Exploratory Hypothesis 4 
Details. We ran two discriminant analyses to distinguish 
between truth tellers and lie tellers in the (i) free recall phase and 
(ii) the entire interview using details as the predictor. In both cases, 
the objective group belonging (truthful versus deceptive) was the 
classifying variable. We present the cross-validated ‘leave-one-
out’ results. For the free recall phase, the analysis was significant, 
χ2 = 10.92, Wilks’ λ = .89, p = .001, canonical correlation = .335. 
The majority of lie tellers, 74.5%, were correctly classified but this 
occurred at the expense of correctly classifying truth tellers, 48.9% 
(61.7% total accuracy). For the entire interview, the analysis was not 
significant, χ2 = 3.52, Wilks’ λ = .96, p = .061, canonical correlation 
= .194. The correct classification rates were 63.8% fore lie tellers 
and 55.3% for truth tellers (59.6% total accuracy). Paired-samples 
t-tests showed that the difference in accuracy rates for truth tellers 
in the free recall phase (48.9%) and entire interview (55.3%) was not 
significant, t(47) = 0.77, p = .445. The difference in accuracy rates 
for lie tellers in the free recall phase (74.5%) and entire interview 
(63.8%) was not significant either, t(47) = 1.52, p = .135. This does 
not support Hypothesis 4 for details.
Complications. We ran two discriminant analyses to distinguish 
between truth tellers and lie tellers in the (i) free recall phase and 
(ii) the entire interview using complications as the predictor. In both 
cases, the objective group belonging (truthful versus deceptive) was 
the classifying variable. We present the cross-validated ‘leave-one-
out’ results. For the free recall phase, the analysis was significant, 
χ2 = 14.63, Wilks’ λ = .85, p < .001, canonical correlation = .384. The 
vast majority of lie tellers, 89.4%, were correctly classified but this 
occurred at the expense of correctly classifying truth tellers, 44.7% 
(67.1% total accuracy). For the entire interview, the analysis was also 
significant, χ2 = 23.74, Wilks’ λ = .77, p < .001, canonical correlation 
= .478. Again, the vast majority of lie tellers, 87.2%, were correctly 
classified but this time also the majority of truth tellers (57.4%) 
were correctly classified (72.3% total accuracy). Paired-samples 
t-tests showed that the difference in accuracy rates for truth tellers 
in the entire interview (57.4%) was significantly higher than in the 
free recall phase (44.7%), t(47) = 2.21, p = .032. The difference in 
accuracy rates for lie tellers in the free recall phase (89.4%) and 
entire interview (87.2.%) was not significant, t(47) = 0.44, p = .660. 
This provides support for Hypothesis 4 for truth accuracy only.
Hypothesis Testing: Exploratory Hypothesis 5 
An ANOVA was carried out with veracity as factor and verifiable 
sources mentioned in the verifiable sources phase of the interview 
as dependent variable. Truth tellers reported significantly more 
verifiable sources than liars, see Table 1. The effect size was 
medium but the Bayes factor only showed weak evidence for 
the alternative hypothesis. In the experiment, lie tellers were 
specifically instructed to lie to the interviewer about the package, 
the agent they met, and the location where the exchange took place. 
These were thus the most serious lies in the experiment. We made 
a further distinction in verifiable sources related to these aspects, 
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called ‘exchange and package’ and verifiable sources related to 
other aspects of the mission. The effect was significant only for the 
verifiable sources related to the exchange and package. The effect 
size was medium and the Bayes factor showed strong support for 
the alternative hypothesis. Regarding the verifiable sources related 
to the other aspects, the Bayes factor showed weak evidence for 
the null hypothesis, see Table 1. This provides some support for 
Hypothesis 5.1
Exploratory Analyses for Complications 
Practitioners prefer within-subjects comparisons: comparing 
different responses made by the same interviewee in a single 
interview (Vrij, 2016). We ran a within-subjects analysis for 
complications. Specifically, the initial free recall was the baseline and 
the number of complications reported at that stage were ignored. We 
focused on the number of new complications reported in the phases 
after the initial free recall. We conducted an ANOVA with veracity as 
factor and the total number of new complications reported in the 
phases after the free recall (model statement through to verifiable 
sources) as dependent variable. The analysis revealed a significant 
effect, F(1, 92) = 23.11, p < .001, d = 0.99 (0.55, 1.40), BF10 = 2764.60. 
Truth tellers reported after the free recall more new complications 
(M = 4.32, SD = 3.60, 95% CI [3.52, 5.11]) than lie tellers (M = 1.60, SD 
= 1.45), 95% CI [0.80, 2.39]). The effect size was large and the Bayes 
factor showed very strong support for the alternative hypothesis. We 
did not run similar analyses for details due to the lack of total details 
effects in the phases after the initial free recall.
We finally ran a discriminant analysis to distinguish between truth 
tellers and lie tellers with the number of new complications reported 
in the phases after the free recall as dependent variable. The objective 
group belonging (truthful versus deceptive) was the classifying 
variable. We present the cross-validated ‘leave-one-out’ results. The 
analysis was significant, χ2 = 20.51, Wilks’ λ = .80, p < .001, canonical 
correlation = .448. Substantial majorities of truth tellers (63.8%) and 
lie tellers (76.6%) were correctly classified (70.2% total accuracy rate).
Discussion
In the present experiment, we examined whether differences 
between truth tellers and lie tellers would be more pronounced 
when considering the entire interview versus the initial free recall. 
This pre-registered hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) was supported for 
complications. Truth tellers reported more complications than lie 
tellers both in the free recall (d = .82) and in the entire interview 
(d = 1.05), but the difference was most pronounced for the entire 
interview. When taking into account each phase of the interview, 
truth tellers reported more complications than lie tellers in all phases 
of the interview, except the verifiable sources phase (exploratory 
Hypothesis 2). The increase in complications throughout each 
phase was also more pronounced in truth tellers than in lie tellers 
(exploratory Hypothesis 3). The finding that complications became 
more diagnostic for detecting deceit throughout the different 
phases of the interview could be considered remarkable, given the 
substantial difference in complications that was already obtained 
after the free recall. It could easily have resulted in a ceiling effect but 
that did not happen.
The verifiable sources phase was the only phase in the interview 
without veracity differences in complications. There are at least 
three reasons as to why no veracity differences in complications 
were found in the verifiable sources phase. First, it was the final 
phase of the interview. That puts this phase in a disadvantageous 
position compared to the previous phases because there are fewer 
opportunities to add new complications in later than in earlier 
phases. In other words, perhaps in the verifiable sources phase truth 
tellers had reported all complications they could remember. Second, 
it was the fifth time the interviewees recalled their mission. Perhaps 
at that stage participants were fatigued and did not put enough effort 
in providing new information that included complications. Third, 
the verifiable sources questions had a specific aim: to encourage 
interviewees to report sources that can be checked. It was not 
specifically meant to elicit veracity differences in complications 
unlike the model statement, reverse order, and sketching while 
narrating questions.
Based on the complications reported in the entire interview, 
57.4% of truth tellers were correctly classified, significantly more 
than in the free recall (44.7% accuracy rate). For lie tellers, the 
difference in accuracy rates between free recall (89.4%) and entire 
interview (87.2%) was not significant. Although this shows support 
for Hypothesis 4 regarding truth accuracy rates, the results for 
classifying truth tellers were not impressive. It became higher only 
when the new complications after the initial free recall were taken 
Table 1. Statistical Results as a Function of Veracity
Truth Lie
F p
Cohen’s d BF10
M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI d 95% CI
Details
   Free recall 39.02 (16.60)   34.09, 43.96   27.02 (17.47)  22.09, 31.96 11.66 .001 0.70 0.28, 1.11 31.05
   Model statement 37.34 (22.24)   30.84, 43.84   36.45 (22.61) 29.95, 42.94   0.04 .847 0.04 -0.37, 0.44 00.22
   Reverse order 04.06 (04.59)     2.93, 5.20   2.11 (3.10)  0.97, 3.24   5.87 .017 0.50 0.08, 0.90 02.77
   Sketch 36.58 (19.43)   30.60, 42.56   35.47 (21.78) 29.49, 41.45   0.07 .795 0.05 -0.35, 0.46 00.22
   Verifiable sources 08.38 (07.46)   06.32, 10.45   6.21 (6.80)   4.15, 8.28   2.18 .144 0.30 -0.11, 0.71 00.56
   Total unique details 125.39 (45.10) 111.98, 138.80107.26 (47.43) 93.85, 120.60   6.04 .016 0.39 -0.02, 0.79 01.05
Complications
   Free recall 02.17 (02.48)  1.62, 2.72   0.60 (1.08)  0.04, 1.15 15.95 < .001 0.82 0.39, 1.23 174.74
   Model statement 03.06 (02.69)  2.45, 3.68  1.34 (1.34)  0.73, 1.96 15.46 < .001 0.81 0.38, 1.22 143.70
   Reverse order 00.38 (00.80)  0.22, 0.55  0.04 (0.20) -0.13, 0.21   8.08    .006 0.58 0.16, 0.99 07.05
   Sketch 00.61 (00.94)  0.40, 0.82  0.13 (0.40) -0.08, 0.34 10.36    .002 0.66 0.24, 1.07 18.18
   Verifiable sources 00.26 (00.71)  0.11, 0.42  0.09 (0.28) -0.07, 0.24   2.59    .111 0.32 -0.09, 0.72 00.68
   Total unique complications 06.49 (05.40)  5.33, 7.65  2.19 (1.83)  1.04, 3.35 27.25 < .001 1.05 0.62, 1.48 12,760.86
Verifiable sources
   Total 6.52 (3.08)  5.66, 7.38  5.04 (2.85)  4.18, 5.90   5.84    .018 0.50 0.08, 0.90 02.74
   Location 2.43 (1.44)  2.05, 2.82  1.62 (1.21)  1.23, 2.00   8.90    .004 0.61 0.19, 1.01 09.95
   Elsewhere 4.09 (2.29)  3.39, 4.78  3.43 (2.52)  2.73, 4.12   1.77    .186 0.27 0.14, 0.68 00.47
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into account. In that scenario, a better correct classification of truth 
tellers (63.8%) was obtained whilst the correct classification of lie 
tellers remained high (76.6%) (70.2% total accuracy). Considering 
only the new complications after the free recall results in a within-
subjects comparison, the initial free recall is used as a baseline and 
only additions to this baseline are taken into account for veracity 
assessment purposes. Within-subjects comparisons are preferred by 
practitioners as they control for individual differences (Vrij, 2016). 
The total accuracy rate of 70.2% implies that still substantial 
percentages of truth tellers and lie tellers were incorrectly classified. 
An accuracy rate of around 70% is typical in verbal lie detection 
research. It is for example obtained in the Verifiability Approach, 
the Assessment Criteria Indicative of Deception tool, Criteria-Based 
Content Analysis, and Reality Monitoring (Vrij, 2018). It thus appears 
to be challenging to obtain accuracy rates above 70% when making 
veracity assessments based on speech content. There are at least 
four reasons why in the present experiment (and perhaps in making 
veracity assessments based on speech content in general) accuracy 
rates much beyond 70% are typically not achieved.
The first reason is related to laboratory research, suggesting that 
in real life higher accuracy rates could be obtained. Although truth 
tellers more than lie tellers reported sources that could be verified, lie 
tellers were not shy of bluffing and also reported verifiable sources, 
including about crucial aspects of the mission: the exchange and 
package. We think that bluffing is more likely to occur in an experiment 
than in real life, because the consequences of getting caught are more 
severe in real life than in an experiment. In addition, in all likelihood 
truth tellers will put more effort in recalling an account five times in 
real life than in a laboratory experiment. This could result in more 
additional details and complications after each phase in real life 
than in the laboratory. Veracity differences are therefore likely to be 
more pronounced in real life than in an experiment. Second, making 
veracity assessments based on speech content alone is difficult 
because there is nothing a statement could be compared with, such as 
evidence. If a statement could be compared with evidence, accuracy 
rates are likely to increase. In the present experiment truth tellers and 
lie tellers provided many details that investigators could check, and 
such checks would have confirmed that truth tellers were speaking 
the truth and lie tellers were not.
Third, lie tellers reported that large parts of their statements were 
truthful (38.30%), which reflects real life (Leins et al., 2013). The more 
truthful information lie tellers report, the more they will sound like 
truth tellers and the more difficult it will become to distinguish them 
from truth tellers. Fourth, in the present experiment – as well as in 
verbal lie detection in general – a good within-subjects measure was 
lacking. A good within-subjects measure would be that truth tellers 
would report something (i.e., complications) whereas lie tellers 
would never report complications but would report something else 
instead. We did not examine cues that lie tellers tend to report more 
than truth tellers in the present experiment.
Vrij and colleagues recently started to examine apart from 
complications (a cue to truthfulness) two cues to deceit: common 
knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies (Vrij & Vrij, 2020; 
Vrij, Leal, Jupe, et al, 2018; Vrij, Leal, et al., 2020). Common knowledge 
details refer to strongly invoked stereotypical information about 
events (“We visited the Louvre museum where was saw the Mona 
Lisa”) (Vrij, Leal, et al., 2020). Self-handicapping strategies refer to 
explicit or implicit justifications as to why someone is not able to 
provide information (“I can’t remember; it was a while ago when 
this happened”) (Vrij, Leal, et al., 2020). Common knowledge details 
and self-handicapping strategies were not coded in the present 
experiment because a quick scan of the transcripts revealed that they 
rarely occurred.
To examine common knowledge details and self-handicapping 
strategies other deception scenarios are required than the one 
introduced in the current experiment. They are typically examined 
in a ‘travel’ scenario where participants report a trip they allegedly 
have made in the last twelve months (Vrij & Vrij, 2020). Making 
a trip is arguably a somewhat scripted activity, which makes 
common knowledge details likely to occur (“We visited the market, 
after which we went to the beach. We had dinner in a Mexican 
restaurant”). And when the trip occurred some time ago, it gives lie 
tellers the opportunity to include self-handicapping strategies (“I 
cannot remember which restaurants we went to in the evenings, 
we went there three months ago”). The situation is different when, 
for example, a source approaches his handler saying that he just 
overheard a conversation about the planning of an attack or, as in 
the present study, an agent discusses a mission s/he just completed. 
Common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies are 
unlikely to occur in those scenarios. For common knowledge details 
to occur frequently enough to be analysed, interviewees probably 
have to describe an event that lasted longer than the short mission 
used in the present experiment. For self-handicapping strategies 
to occur frequently enough to be analysed, a larger time interval 
between the allegedly experienced event and the interview is 
probably required than the short time interval used in the present 
experiment. 
The results for details were not as predicted. Truth tellers 
reported more details than lie tellers after both the free recall 
and the entire interview, but the difference did not become more 
pronounced throughout the interview. This does not support the 
pre-registered Hypothesis 1 for details and, since the exploratory 
Hypotheses 2 and 4 were based on the pre-registered Hypothesis 
1, exploratory Hypotheses 2 to 4 were not supported either. The 
results in the individual phases may explain why the hypothesis 
was not supported. Truth tellers and lie tellers reported a similar 
number of new details after the model statement, which reflects 
the typical finding in previous model statement research (Vrij, 
Leal, & Fisher, 2018). Truth tellers reported more additional details 
than lie tellers after the reverse order recall. This also reflects 
previous research (Ewens, Vrij, Mann, et al., 2016; Shaw et al., 
2014). However, the number of details truth tellers and lie tellers 
added in the reverse order phase was more than ten times smaller 
(M = 3) than what they added in the model statement (M = 37) 
and sketch (M = 36) phases. Therefore, the reverse order veracity 
effect had only limited impact on the veracity effect in the entire 
interview. Since the sketch phase followed the reverse order phase 
but resulted in more details, the position of the reverse order in 
the interview sequence cannot fully explain this finding. A reason 
why interviewees added so few new details in the reverse order 
phase is that a reverse order recall is a mentally taxing activity (Vrij 
et al., 2008). Putting a mental strain on interviewees is likely to 
have a negative effect on reporting information (Vrij, Meissner, et 
al., 2017).
Truth tellers and lie tellers reported an equal number of new 
details in the sketch phase, which contradicts Vrij, Leal, Fisher, 
et al. 2018 and Vrij, Mann, et al., 2020, but is in alignment with 
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, et al. (2019). As expected, truth tellers added a 
substantial number of details in this phase; the effect was not 
significant because lie tellers also added a large number of new 
details. The sketch question focused on the exchange, the part 
of the missions lie tellers were instructed to lie about. That they 
added so much details about this part of the mission indicates that 
they may have been bluffing. Perhaps they thought it unlikely that 
their statements would be checked. If true, better results would be 
achieved if real life settings where bluffing is less likely to occur.
Although the findings regarding details were disappointing 
from a lie detection perspective, they were positive from an 
information-gathering perspective as the different phases 
generated a considerable number of new details. For truth tellers, 
the number of unique details provided in the interview went up 
from 39 in the free recall to 125 in the entire interview and for 
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lie tellers from 34 in the free recall to 107 in the entire interview. 
These are encouraging findings. Perhaps the most crucial aim of 
an interview is to generate information (Bull, 2010; Fisher, 2010) 
and CCA achieved that. This is also good news for lie detection. The 
more information an interviewee volunteers, the more opportunity 
for investigators to check the veracity status of the statement. Thus, 
although CCA did not increase the ability to distinguish between 
truth tellers and lie tellers during the interview when taking 
total details into account, it may facilitate lie detection after the 
interview when investigators have the opportunity to check the 
information provided.
Truth tellers reported more sources that could be verified than 
lie tellers. However, this was the case only for sources referring to 
the package and exchange, the aspects of the mission the lie tellers 
were instructed to lie about. This underlines our earlier conclusion, 
that the more truthful information lie tellers report, the more they 
will sound like truth tellers and the more difficult it will become 
to distinguish them from truth tellers. That verifiable sources 
discriminated truth tellers from lie tellers is in alignment with 
previous research (Leal, Vrij, Vernham, et al., 2018; Vrij, Leal, Deeb, 
et al., 2019) and good news for practitioners who are interested 
in the Verifiability Approach. Counting verifiable and unverifiable 
details, as advocated in the Verifiability Approach, is impossible 
to achieve for practitioners in real time, whereas they can count 
verifiable sources in real time. The same applies to the total details 
– complications comparison. Practitioners cannot count total 
details in real time, but they can count complications in real time.
Two methodological issues merit attention. First, we did not 
systematically manipulate the different interview techniques. This 
means that we cannot say anything about the relative impact of 
each of the techniques. That was not the aim of the experiment. We 
attempted to examine their combined effect on truth tellers’ and lie 
tellers’ responses, making a systematic manipulation unnecessary. 
Second, we did not vary the order in which the techniques were 
presented. We chose what we thought was the best and a natural 
order. Of course, not varying the order means that we cannot tell 
whether results would have been different if the techniques were 
introduced in a different order. 
We think the present research can be extended in several ways. 
Creating a deception scenario in which (i) bluffing by lie tellers 
is less likely to occur and (ii) common knowledge details and 
self-handicapping strategies can be measured, will enhance our 
knowledge about the potential of CCA as a veracity assessment 
approach. In addition, manipulating the different techniques 
and order of the techniques will enhance our knowledge about 
the relative impact of each technique. Finally, the CCA interview 
protocol examined in this article requires asking interviewees to 
recall their accounts five times. Although this is possible in many 
applied settings, sometimes shorter protocols may be warranted. 
Further research could examine the efficacy of CCA when one or 
two techniques are left out. 
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Note
1The distinction between ‘exchange and package’ versus ‘other’ 
can also be made for details and complications. The results for details 
follow the same pattern of findings as reported in the main text. 
For complications, again the same pattern emerged as presented in 
the main text, but the effects were stronger for the ‘exchange and 
package’ complications than for the ‘other’ complications. The full 
description of the analyses is available from the first author.
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Appendix
The Interview Protocol
Q1. Please tell me in as much detail as possible everything you did from the moment you left this building to the moment you came back. 
Thank you for that, I would now like you to tell me again, but this time, before doing so I would like to play you an audio clip which serves 
as an example of how many details I would like you to include in your response. The example I will play is a so called ‘Model Statement’ as it 
gives you an idea of a detailed response to a question. After listening to the example, I will ask you again about what happened during your 
mission, and would like you to be that detailed in your response ok?
Play Model Statement
Q2. Bearing in mind the amount of detail you heard in that clip, please tell me once more everything that happened from the moment you 
left the building till the moment you returned.
Q3. Thank you for that, what I would like to do now is ask you to recall your event in reverse order. I ask this because we know from memory 
research that recalling an event in reverse order aids memory recall. Therefore, I would like you to go back in your memory and recall the event 
once more but this time talk me back through from the moment you returned to the experimenter right back through to the moment you left 
the building to collect the package. Please take as much time as you need to prepare yourself for this and to recall the event in reverse order.
Q4. Thank you once again. Another aid to memory is drawing. I would therefore like you to go back in your memory to the moment you re-
ceived the package. Please think about that specific moment and recall everything what you could see, what you could hear, what you could feel 
and what you could smell. OK? Now please draw for me what you could see at that moment and whilst doing so, talk me through everything 
you experienced. I realise that not everyone is good at drawing, so I would like you to talk to me whilst you draw so that I can understand your 
drawing.
Q5. What I would like you to do now is to talk me through the whole event one final time, but this time I would like you to help me out by 
including any details that you think I could verify – an example of a detail I could verify would be CCTV footage, official records such as receipts, 
people who you know by name and who saw you during the mission, etc. Does that make it clear what verifiable details are? OK, please talk me 
through the whole event once more, but this time, at each phase include any details I can verify.
